A recent vote in the House of Lords in London proves that there are fortunately still some intelligent people who are thinking about privacy and personal freedom.
The United Kingdom is about to embark on the most ambitious and complex ID system ever contemplated anywhere in the World, yet it is found flawed by industry experts and third parties.
The House of Lords participation at a recent session was unusually high and the new national ID card Bill was thoroughly debated before amending the House of Commons Government Report on three counts. The Lords demand an accurate budget, tighter security in data collection & storage and even re-wording on the exact purpose of the scheme. Reviews of the Report in the House of Lords will continue and amongst other things will discuss the contentious proposals to link the ID card with a passport.
The British Home Office’s national ID card proposal, intended to fight crime, combat terrorism, prevent identity fraud, prevent illegal immigration and increase the efficiency of access to government services is not only technically inadequate and flawed, but seriously under budgeted.
The London School of Economics, which has no legitimate reason for bias, released a 300 page report in June 2005 on The Identity Project, prepared by 16 Professors and countless international experts. It outlines that if the scheme were to be introduced, risks to personal privacy would be increased and the danger of identity theft likewise. The freedom of movement of EU citizens within the UK could be restricted and thus the scheme could possibly conflict with current EU laws.
The ID card scheme will ‘Alter the nature of British society’ and ‘the relationship between the individual and the State will change.’ LSE emphasises that the proposal could indeed cause mistrust toward the Government.
Remembering that this most ambitious data collection & exchange scheme might lead to imitation by other countries, if loss of personal privacy is important to you, then you should read the June 2005 Executive Summary. It ends with the words, ‘The risk of failure in the current proposals is therefore magnified to the point where the scheme should be regarded as a potential danger to the public interest and to the legal rights of individuals.’
LSE’s January 2006 Research Status Report update is however the most valuable document on the subject and reviews many contentious issues. The budgetary figures could not be updated due to the Home Office’s refusal to cooperate, but LSE saw no reason to correct their estimated total figure.
In the updated Report on Research Status (see the top of the page under “NEW”), Dr Edgar Whitley, reader in information systems at LSE said: ‘We have been surprised at how little consistent or reliable information exists about the government's proposals. Claims are routinely made for the scheme and then just as quickly are abandoned or contradicted.’
The update explains: ‘At the outset, the LSE Identity Project supported the implementation of an identity scheme in principle but expressed significant concerns regarding the Home Office proposal. In light of the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts that have emerged, serious unanswered concerns that remain, project dynamics that are dysfunctional and potential outcomes that may be harmful to the public interest we can now no longer support even the principle of an identity scheme owned and operated by the Home Office.’ The report acknowledges help from the Foundation for Information Policy Research and such astute scientists as Professor Ross Anderson and other notable ladies and gentlemen in the scientific community.
I can be more open in my comments than LSE, but even they, who conduct a great deal of research for the UK Government, voice harsh criticism.
Vacillating over which features will be actually used and with a budget only approaching a quarter of that of the LSE estimate, the Home Office is clearly hiding many costs that will likely fall under different department budgets. Presumably a budget that is too high is politically unpalatable, particularly when the only purpose that can be distilled from current information is to provide a policing surveillance weapon unheard of in the UK or elsewhere.
An important security vulnerability in the plan, according to a leading Microsoft engineer, could trigger ‘massive identity fraud on a scale beyond anything we have seen before’.
The world’s technological authority, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers writes that the proposed biometric ID cards won't prevent fraud or terrorism and furthermore, “The design of the system is based on unreliable and inadequate technologies that could result in privacy and security problems”.
Note:
David Blunkett, who “masterminded” UK's ID card, was last mentioned here.
Historical note:
‘The House of Lords’ has served the country very well for centuries within the UK’s unusual Parliamentary system. Their efficiency was diluted when the current Prime Minister abolished hereditary positions in the House of Lords Act 1999.
Clearly, the House of Lords has had the foresight to consult with the Houses of Learning on this important personal privacy issue. Thanks to the good Lords!
